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Abstract
In this paper, we compare the political equilibrium outcomes under two distinct
institutional setups concerning the regulated firms’ lobbying environment: collec-
tive and individual lobbying. Under both regimes, each firm voluntarily chooses
whether or not to participate in lobbying activities to influence an environmental
regulation with which all the firms need to comply eventually. While, under col-
lective lobbying, firms form a single group before conducting lobbying activities,
there is no such pre-coordination under individual lobbying and firms can lobby
independently if they wish. The difference in the equilibrium outcomes is quite
striking: whereas only a small fraction of firms join the industrial lobbying group
under collective lobbying, all the firms participate in lobbying activities in the case
of individual lobbying. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes
from the perspectives of both individual firms and the society as a whole, and dis-
cuss the implications for possible institutional interventions.
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1 Introduction
Lobbying is considered to be an increasingly important part of a policy-making process in
modern democracies. Based on a number of empirical reports, Grossman and Helpman
(2001) conclude that “the number of SIGs (Special Interest Groups) active in national
politics in the United States is by no means small, and probably continues to grow (page
2).” As for the EU, Dinan and Wesselius (2010) claim that there are about 30,000
lobbyists in Brussels, the same number as the number of EU Commission employees, and
it is estimated that lobbyists influence as much as 75% of legislation (The Guardian,
2014).
In particular, industrial interests are quite active in lobbying against stringent envi-
ronmental regulations. Delmas, Lim and Nairn-Birch (2016) estimate that, in the U.S.,
major fossil-fuel producers (e.g., ExxonMobil and Chevron), industrial goods manufac-
tures (e.g., General Electric) and some utility firms (e.g., PG&E), each spent $20-30
million dollars lobbying against climate change legislation around 2008-2009. It is also
common to observe that industrial interests are represented by consortiums of firms, in-
cluding trade associations (e.g., American Iron and Steel Institute) and peak business
associations (e.g., National Association of Manufactures). For instance, in 2008 the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce spent more than $60 million on climate change lobbying (Delmas
et al., 2016).
In most of the recent political economics literature, SIGs’ political influence through
lobby contributions is modeled as a “menu-auction,” following the seminal works of Bern-
heim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). A menu-auction model
of lobbying activities is based on the idea that lobby contributions buy influence in
policy-making processes.1 Since its adoptions by Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998)
to the analysis of an environmental policy-making, this “common agency” approach has
steadily gained in popularity in the field of environmental economics as well. For instance,
it has been used to analyze the interaction between international trade and environmental
1There are an abundance of empirical findings to support this claim. For instance, Baldwin and
Magee (2000) looked at how legislators voted on several trade bills and found that the probability of a
vote in favor of trade liberalization increased with the amount of contributions that a legislator received
from business interests and fell with the amount collected from labor unions.
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policies (Eliste and Fredricksson, 2002; and Lai, 2007), and the influences of domestic lob-
bying activities on international environmental agreements (Habra and Whinkler, 2012;
and Marchiori, Dietz and Tavoni, 2017).
In most of the models which utilize the common agency framework, the organizational
aspects of respective lobbyists are taken for granted, and not much attention has been
paid to how lobby groups are originally formed. However, it is quite probable that
different institutional settings induce strikingly different forms of lobby organizations,
which in turn lead to varied efficiency implications and distributional impacts. In his
early survey of the literature, Persson (1998) considers exogenous supposition of lobby
groups a crucial and difficult question to which there is no satisfactory answer despite
the important aspects of the problem raised by Olson (1965). In his more recent survey
of the literature, van Winden (2008) considers it one of strong assumptions of existing
common agency models to suppose that “interest groups are exogenously given, of fixed
size and are assumed to behave as unitary actors.”
Since Persson (1998), indeed, there have been several papers that address the issue of
endogenous formation of lobby groups, based on the common agency model. The main
strand of works on endogenous lobby formation approaches the problem by focusing on
the role of a fixed cost which must be incurred in participating in lobbying activities
(Mitra, 1999; Damania and Fredricksson, 2003; and Laussel, 2006).2 These studies reveal
how the characteristics of the fixed cost is related to the lobby formations and resulting
political equilibrium outcomes. They also clarify the conditions to ensure the uniqueness
of an equilibrium for a lobby formation game.
Unlike other works, Damania and Fredricksson (2000), not including a fixed cost in
their formulation, set up an infinitely-repeated duopoly model and investigate into the
relation between the collusive profits of the industry and the degree of political activities.3
In their formulation, they suppose that the formation of a lobby group is equivalent to
2The idea of the fixed “organizing” cost originally appears in Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). Felli
and Merlo (2006) also consider the endogenous determination of lobby groups, but their study is quite
different from ours as well as the other works cited here, in that their framework is a citizen-candidate
model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), and also in that it is the politician
who selects the lobby groups he/she would bargain with, and not the lobbyists themselves.
3We show below that, in out setup, the collusiveness of an industry is not important in inducing firms
to join the lobbying activities.
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each firm independently offering the government a political contribution schedule. This
situation is considered in this paper to be the case of “individual lobbying.” Under
individual lobbying, each decision-maker can decides whether or not it conducts lobbying
activities, concurrently with how it would lobby if it enters the lobbying game.4
As is described above, consortiums of business entities usually have outstanding lob-
bying presence in environmental issues as in other areas of economic and societal policy-
makings. Therefore, we also analyze a different case where firms coordinate their lobbying
activities before they actually lobby. We refer to this situation as “collective lobbying.”
Under the collective lobbying regime, those who share the same or similar interest first
organize a single lobby group before they actually conduct lobbying activities as a single
lobbyist. In a sense, this situation can be interpreted as a case where a certain explicit or
implicit institutional restriction is imposed on the lobby formation, such as a minimum
size requirement for being qualified as a lobbyist. Such a restriction on potential lobbyists
might be socially desirable when there are significant transaction costs involved in each
lobbying process.5 We explore the impacts of this type of institutional intervention on
social welfare as well as on the other aspects of the equilibrium outcome, such as the
degree of lobby participation and resulting payoff for each firm.
In this paper, we use a highly-aggregated model of an environmental policy-making
under lobbying activities. In endogenizing the process of lobby participation, we do not
consider the role of a fixed cost of organizing a lobby group, and, as a new contribu-
tion to the existing literature, we compare the two distinct institutional environments
concerning the lobby formation; collective and individual lobbying. Our main research
questions are as follows. If there are multiple entities which share the same or similar
interests, how lobbying activities will be conducted, especially, under different institu-
tional environments concerning lobby formation? Are they better off lobbying together
or independently? What are the implications of having different institutional setups for
social welfare?
4While our framework is essentially a one-shot game, we offer a dynamic interpretation of this regime
when the game is repeated in 3.2 below.
5In addition, such a restriction can be also beneficial to the affected lobbyists if they can take advantage
of certain scale economies in organizing an interest group and conducting lobbying activities through
sharing a variety of resources, although we do not include this potential benefit in our model below.
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The difference in the lobbying regimes produces strikingly different equilibrium prop-
erties. While only a small fraction of firms are engaged in lobbying activities under the
collective lobbying regime, all the firms participate in lobbying in the unique equilibrium
under individual lobbying. As for the collective lobbying regime, we find that the equi-
librium outcome is unanimously less preferred by all the firms to the outcome where all
of them are collectively engaged in lobbying. This result is akin to the classic observation
made by Olson (1965), who discusses the free-rider issue in a broad context and argues
that, when interests are shared, rational actors should prefer to free-ride and let others
pay the cost of goods that will benefit everyone.
Under the individual lobbying regime, on the other hand, every firm voluntarily
chooses to lobby for a policy which benefits not just itself but those who share the com-
mon interest in having a laxer environmental regulation. Rather paradoxically, hence,
seemingly “coordinated” mutually-beneficial actions by lobbyists take place only when
the group formation process is not pre-coordinated. In a sense, if lobby formation is more
loosely organized, the industry can achieve a better result for each one of its members.
From the social welfare perspective, however, the restriction that an individual firm has
no political access to the policymaker can be desirable although it would be harmful to
each individual firm. In such a case, however, certain types of social interests might be
significantly underrepresented according to our result.6 This possibility should be taken
into account in designing a socially preferable intervention on lobby formation.
In section 2, we set up a simple model of an environmental policy-making under lobby-
ing activities, focusing on the two distinct institutional environments for lobby formation.
In the ensuing section, we derive and compare the political equilibrium outcomes under
the different cases, and discuss the implications for possible institutional designs. The
final section concludes the paper.
.
6An potential counteracting force is the presence of certain scale economies in forming a single lobby
among multiple entities by sharing indispensable resources in lobbying.
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2 The Model
Following a typical formulation of a lobbying game model in the literature, we consider
an economy with a national government which is assumed to be represented by a single
policymaker. The policymaker is usually considered as a ruling party of the nation and
has an interest in receiving political contributions from lobbyists.7 Such contributions
can benefit the policymaker in several ways, including helping him/her to be reelected
in the next election. At the same time, the policymaker is concerned with the social
welfare of the general public partly because it would also affect the prospect of his or her
re-election.8 For simplicity, we suppose that the policymaker makes his or her decisions
on the environmental regulation at hand, independently of the other political agendas.
As for the other parties, there exist producers and consumers of goods which emit
a particular pollutant in their production and/or consumption, and they respectively
derive the benefits from the pollutant emissions, denoted by e, during their production
and consumption processes in terms of cost savings, for example. We assume that there
exist a sufficiently large number, N , of symmetric entities which respectively benefit from
the pollutant emission. Specifically, we suppose N ≥ 4 in the analysis of the next section.
For the sake of convenience, we call each entity a “firm” throughout the paper, even if
it can potentially include consumers that profit from a laxer emission control through
cheaper product prices.
We write the benefit of the pollutant emission as B(e) for a single firm. On the
environmental damage side, we denote the damage cost to the whole society due to the
pollutant emissions from a single firm as D(e). Thus, the social welfare of the citizens
7Grossman and Helpman (2001) report that 78 percent of the monies from the PACs (Political Action
Committees) went to incumbent candidates in 1997-1998.
8Note that we are excluding neither altruism nor statesmanship on the part of a policymaker.
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affected by this environmental regulation, W (e), is given by9
W (e) = N(B(e)−D(e)). (1)
Here, we choose the unit of measuring the level of e so that the benefit is effectively
represented by a linear function in e as follows:10
B(e) = β · e, (2)
where β is a positive parameter. On the other hand, the damage cost due to the emissions
by one firm is represented by a strictly increasing and convex function. For simplicity,
we assume the damage cost to be represented by a quadratic function in e:
D(e) =
1
2
· δ · e2, (3)
where δ is a positive parameter.
Let us first consider the case where the policymaker maximizes its domestic social
welfare defined in (1) by choosing the emission limit, e, for each firm. Such a welfare-
maximizing emission limit, e∗, can be easily obtained as
e∗ =
β
δ
. (4)
In reality, a policymaker is likely to have other interests than simply maximizing social
welfare in choosing the per-firm emission limit. Following the literature, we consider
that the payoff of the policymaker is given by the weighted sum of the social welfare
of its own citizens, given by W (e), and the amount of contributions provided by the
9Here, we effectively suppose that, when an emission limit is imposed by the policymaker, each firm
always emits up to this exact level in order to maximize its benefit. Also, we assume that the policymaker
cannot implement different levels of emission control across firms. In reality, relatively cleaner firms might
lobby for a stricter environmental regulation if that bestows those firms with competitive advantages
over other firms (Delmas et al., 2016). For the sake of simplicity, however, we consider that all the firms
are uniform and, moreover, that a stricter emission control always results in financial losses for the firms.
10Alternatively, we can suppose that the polluting industry is contained in a small open economy
and also that an extra unit of emissions allowed yields each price-taking firm some constant amount
of benefits. However, applications of the current model are much broader than what this alternative
formulation suggests.
7
lobbyists. We suppose that the parameter, θ ∈ [0, 1
2
], is the weight attached to the
social welfare, net of the contributions by the lobbies, and (1− θ) is the weight attached
to the contribution amounts in the mind of the policymaker.11 Our setup indicates
that a decrease in θ represents an increase in the openness of the policymaker to lobby
contributions in comparison with social welfare.
Lobbying activities in a common agency model are succinctly summarized by the
simultaneous offerings of “contribution schedules” by lobbyists, which express how much
respective lobbyists commit themselves to pay to a policymaker when a certain level of
the emission limit is chosen subsequently by the policymaker. Let us suppose that the
policymaker obtains the total contribution amount of c from the lobbyists. Noting that
the contributions by lobbyists imply a decrease in the net welfare of the citizens by the
same amount, the policymaker’s payoff can be written as
θ {W (e)− c}+ (1− θ) c = θW (e) + (1− 2θ) c. (5)
Now, we introduce lobbyists to the model. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
there exist only one environmental lobby (indexed by G), which is concerned only with
the magnitude of environmental damages inflicted upon its members.12 Provided that
the environmental lobbyist promises to pay the amount of CG(e) as its lobby contribution
when e is chosen by the policymaker, its net payoff becomes13
UG(e, CG(e)) = −ωGN ·D(e)− CG(e), (6)
where ωG ∈ [0, 1] is called the organization ratio of the environmental lobby and indicates
how much of the cost from the total pollutant emissions is represented by this lobbyist.
In order to focus on how the industry lobby is formed under different regimes, we suppose
that ωG is exogenously given in this study.
11We suppose that the maximum possible value of the parameter θ is 12 , because, if θ exceeded
1
2 , the
policymaker would value the welfare of the citizens higher than the lobby contributions, and so never
accept any contributions from lobby groups.
12In fact, the setup is easily extended to a case of multiple independent environmental lobbies as in
the case of individual lobbying by the industrial lobbyists described below.
13For simplicity, all the lobby contributions are measured in a monetary term throughout this paper.
8
The following two subsections describe the two possible environments under which
the industrial lobbying activities are conducted, and also explain how an equilibrium
outcome can be obtained in each case.
2.1 Collective Lobbying
As for the case of collective lobbying, we suppose that, in order to join a lobby group,
each firm first commit itself to be a part of the industrial lobby group and, after having
formed one industrial lobby group, the lobbyist actually works as a single entity. The
industrial lobbyist, which consists of M(≤ N) firms, conducts lobbying activities so as
to maximize its collective payoff. More specifically, we model this case as a sequential
game where each individual firm voluntarily decides whether or not to join the industrial
lobby in the first stage, and, having formed one group which exclusively represents the
industrial interest of its own, the lobbyist collectively engages in lobbying activities in
the second stage, concurrently with the environmental lobbyist described above. Again,
lobbying activities here are summarized as a proposal of a contribution schedule, which
depends solely on the subsequent choice by the policymaker.
Taking into account the potential lobby contributions, CCM(e), which it commits itself
to pay when e is chosen by the policymaker,14 the collective payoff of the industrial lobby
is given by
UCM(e, C
C
M(e)) = ωP (M)N ·B(e)− CCM(e), (7)
where ωP (M) =
M
N
∈ [0, 1] denotes the organization ratio of the industrial lobby when
M(≤ N) firms have decided to join the lobby in the first stage.
We denote the resulting equilibrium emission limit when M firms participate in the
collective lobbying by eCM . As an important assumption, we suppose that participating
firms in this lobby split the total contribution amount equally among them and, thereby,
ignore the potential effects of some scale economies and transaction costs associated with
lobbying. Then, the payoff of a firm in the industrial lobby group is
B(eCM)−
1
M
CCM(e
C
M). (8)
14The superscript C denotes the case under collective lobbying.
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Since a firm would obtain B(eCM−1) by choosing not to participate in lobbying, the
equilibrium number of the firms which join the industrial lobby group in the first stage
is given by the largest non-negative integer M which satisfies
BM(e
C
M)−
1
M
CCM(e
C
M) ≥ B(eCM−1). (9)
Or,
B(eCM)−B(eCM−1) ≥
1
M
CCM(e
C
M). (10)
In the above inequality, the left-hand side is the benefit of a firm joining the lobby
group, which is given by the increase in its benefit due to stronger lobbying efforts made
collectively by the industrial lobbyist, and the right-hand side is the cost of joining the
lobby group in terms of having to pay its share of the lobby contribution.
2.2 Individual Lobbying
If individual firms are lobbying independently or separately, there is no lobby formation
stage as in the case of collective lobbying, and each firm directly engages in lobbying
activities if it chooses to do so. Taking into account the potential lobby contributions,
CIM(e), i.e., how much its promise to pay according to the level of e under individual
lobbying when the total of M firms are lobbying,15 the payoff of one particular lobbying
firm under individual lobbying, U IM(e), is given by
U IM(e, C i(e)) = B(e)− CIM(e). (11)
A single firm’s payoff from participating in its own lobbying activities when M − 1 other
firms are also lobbying individually is given by
B(eIM)− CIM(eIM), (12)
where eIM denotes the equilibrium level of e under individual lobbying when M firms are
lobbying in total.
15The superscript I denotes the case under individual lobbying.
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If a firm does not lobby itself, its payoff becomes B(eIM−1). Therefore, the firm should
lobby if and only if
B(eIM)− CIM(eIM) ≥ B(eIM−1). (13)
Therefore, the equilibrium number of the firms which take part in lobbying is given by
the largest non-negative integer M which satisfies
B(eIM)−B(eIM−1) ≥ CIM(eIM). (14)
3 Analysis
As for a lobbying game which involves the policymaker and the lobbyists, we focus on a
so-called “compensating equilibrium.” This equilibrium concept provides a sharp predic-
tion on the outcome of the game, especially concerning the contribution amounts.16 A
compensating equilibrium is based on the idea that, if there were a change in the policy,
the change in contribution should compensate a lobbyist for that change in the policy, so
that the lobbyist’s payoff remains the same. Such an amount of contribution can be ex-
pressed as a “compensating contribution schedule,” and an equilibrium that arises when
all groups use compensating contribution schedules is called a compensating equilibrium.
Grossman and Helpman (2001) show that, no matter what type of contribution sched-
ules a given group’s rivals are expected to follow, the group can always respond with a
compensating contribution schedule at no extra cost. Further rationales are offered by
Grossman and Helpman (2001) for concentrating on a compensating equilibrium, such
as its characteristics of being uniquely both Pareto-efficient and coalition-proof, which
could potentially make the equilibrium a focal point of a lobbying game. The derivation
of the compensating equilibrium is detailed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Gross-
man and Helpman (2001), and we adapt their procedure to our environmental regulation
model.
16Otherwise, multiple equilibrium is a norm in a menu-auction model. A compensating equilibrium
concept was originally called a truthful equilibrium (Bernheim and Whinston 1986, and Grossman and
Helpman 1994) although a lobby interaction is usually modeled as a game of complete information.
The term “compensating” seems more appropriate as it nicely reflects the relationship between the
contribution level and the economic concept of Hicksian compensating variation (Grossman and Helpman,
2001).
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3.1 Collective Lobbying
Let us suppose that the total of M(≤ N , where N ≤ 4 by assumption) firms have
constituted the industrial lobby group in the initial lobby formation stage. Thus, the
industrial lobby’s joint payoff is given by (7). On the other hand, the environmental
lobby’s payoff is given by (6).
As has been described above, these two lobbyists and the policymaker play a sequential
game within the subsequent lobbying game stage. To start off, the two lobbies respectively
present their own contribution schedules to the policymaker. Such schedules are given by
CCM(e) for the industrial lobby and C
C
G(e) for the environmental lobby in the collective
lobbying case.17 These contribution schedules are based only on the emission limit chosen
by the policymaker, and their provisions are fully committed by the lobbies. Then, the
policymaker chooses the emission limit per firm, e, so as to maximize its own payoff.
When both lobbyists are contributing, the policymaker’s payoff with lobbying contri-
butions, denoted by Z(e), is written as
Z(e) = θ
(
N ·B(e)−N ·D(e)− CCM(e)− CCG(e)
)
+ (1− θ) (CCM(e) + CCG(e)) , (15)
where θ ∈ [0, 1
2
] is the weight attached to the social welfare, net of the contributions by
the lobbyists, and (1− θ) ∈ [1
2
, 1] is the weight attached to the contribution amounts.
At the political equilibrium under collective lobbying, whose emission limit is denoted
by eCM , the equilibrium outcome must be jointly efficient for the government and the two
lobbyists.18 In order to derive such an emission limit, let us fix the payoffs of the lobbyists
at certain pre-determined levels. In particular, the two lobby groups respectively achieve
the payoffs of UCM(e
C
M , C
C
M(e
C
M)) and UG(e
C
G, C
C
G(e
C
M)) at the political equilibrium. Thus,
we use the following equality as the constraint in the problem to find the jointly efficient
emission level:
CCM(e)+C
C
G(e) = ωP (M) ·N ·B(e)−UCM(eCM , CCM(eCM))−ωGi N ·D(e)−UG(eCM , CCG(eCM)).
(16)
17Thus, we replace CG(e) by C
C
G (e) in (6) to have UG(e, C
C
G (e)) = −ωGN ·D(e)−CCG (e) for the payoff
of the environmental lobby under collective lobbying.
18The proof can be found in pages 268-269 of Grossman and Helpman (2001).
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Inserting (16) into (15), the policymaker’s payoff under this constraint becomes
Z(e) = {θ + (1− 2θ)ωP (M)}N ·B(e)− {θ + (1− 2θ)ωG}N ·D(e)
+ (1− 2θ) (UM(eCM , CCM(eCM)) + UG(eCM , CCG(eCM))) . (17)
The first-order condition for maximizing (17) with respect to e under (2) and (3) is
{θ + (1− 2θ)ωP (M)} β − {θ + (1− 2θ)ωG} δe = 0. (18)
Solving (18) for e, we obtain the following jointly-efficient level of emissions, eCM , which
arises in the political equilibrium of this common agency game under the collective lob-
bying activities by M firms:
eCM =
θ + (1− 2θ)ωP (M)
θ + (1− 2θ)ωG ·
β
δ
. (19)
Now, we turn to a more demanding task of identifying the contribution amounts,
i.e., CCM(e
C
M) and C
C
G(e
C
M), at this political equilibrium under collective lobbying. Here,
the idea of a compensating equilibrium plays a crucial role in circumventing the issue of
multiple equilibria.
Taking into account the lobby contribution, the payoff of the environmental lobby at
this equilibrium under collective lobbying can be written as
UG(e
C
M , C
C
G(e
C
M)) = −ωGN ·D(eCM)− CCG(eCM). (20)
Following Grossman and Helpman (2001), we define the compensating contribution sched-
ule to be the one that coincides with a lobbyist’s indifference curve through the political
equilibrium whenever the contribution amount is positive. The contribution amount is
simply zero elsewhere in the compensating schedule. In particular, the compensating
contribution schedule of the environmental lobby under collective lobbying, denoted by
HCG (e), is
HCG (e) = max
{−ωGi N ·D(e)− UG(eCM , CCG(eCM)), 0} . (21)
Given the above information, we can find the level of the emission limit that the
policymaker would choose in the absence of contribution from the industrial lobby, e−P .
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In this case, the policymaker would maximize a weighted sum of the net social welfare
and the contribution from the environmental lobby alone.19 This maximization problem
leads to
e−P =
θ
θ + (1− 2θ)ωG ·
β
δ
. (22)
The relationship between the political equilibrium and e−P is graphically illustrated in
Figure 1.
eCM ee−P
CCM(e
C
M)
CCM
Z(e)
UM(e, C
C
M(e))
0
Figure 1: The political equilibrium and the emission limit without the industrial lobby
In Figure 1, we have the level of emission on the horizontal axis and the contribution by
the industrial lobby under collective lobbying on the vertical axis. The indifference curve
for the policymaker, which now incorporates the compensating contribution schedule of
the environmental lobby, and the indifference curve for the industrial lobby, which consists
of M firms, through the political equilibrium, eCM , are shown as the curves indexed by
Z(eCM) and UM(e
C
M , C
C
M(e
C
M)), respectively. The compensating contribution schedule of
the industrial lobby, HCM(e), is depicted by the bold line. In particular, the contribution
level of the industrial lobby at the political equilibrium is given by CCM(e
C
M).
At such an equilibrium, the industrial lobby must provide a sufficient contribution
to ensure that the policymaker chooses eCM , instead of e−P , which is the potentially
chosen emission limit with no contribution from the industrial lobbyist. By denoting the
payoff of the policymaker in the absence of the industrial lobby by Z−P (e), therefore,
19In deriving e−P , the weight attached to the net social welfare is still θ while the weight attached to
the contribution from the environmental lobby is 1 − θ, just as in the case of multiple lobbyists above.
In fact, though, e−P can be obtained simply by setting ωP (M) = 0 in (19).
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Z−P (e−P ) = Z(eCM) must hold. In other words, at the political equilibrium, we have
θN (B(e−P )−D(e−P )) + (1− 2θ)
(−ωGN ·D(e−P )− UG(eCM , CCG(eCM))
= θN
(
B(eCM)−D(eCM)
)
+ (1− 2θ) (CCM(eCM) + CCG(eCM)) , (23)
which leads to20
(1− 2θ)CCM(eCM) = θN
{
B(e−P )−D(e−P )−
(
B(eCM)−D(eCM)
)}
+(1− 2θ)ωGN
(
D(eCM)−D(e−P )
)
,
(24)
Using the specific benefit and damage cost functions, i.e., (2) and (3), (24) can be written
as21
(1− 2θ)CCM(eCM) =
N
(
eCM − e−P
) [{θ + (1− 2θ)ωG} · δ2 · (eCM + e−P )− θβ] , (25)
where e−P is given by (22). From (25), we can obtain
CCM(e
C
M) =
N
2
· (1− 2θ) (ωP (M))
2
θ + (1− 2θ)ωG ·
β2
δ
. (26)
Given (19), (26) and ωP (M) =
M
N
, the inequality (10) holds if and only if the following
inequality holds.
1− 2θ
N {θ + (1− 2θ)ωG} ·
β2
δ
≥ M
2N
· 1− 2θ
θ + (1− 2θ)ωG ·
β2
δ
, (27)
which reduces to M ≤ 2. This means that, in the initial lobby formation stage, the
subgame-perfect equilibrium number of the firms which join the industrial lobby is either
one or two.22 Thus, we can conclude that, under collective lobbying, only two firms, at
most, participate in the industrial lobby, no matter what are the values of economic and
political parameters.
As we can see in (27), its left-hand side, which is one particular firm’s benefit of joining
the industrial lobby, is constant with respect to M , while the right-hand side, which is
the cost of participating in collective lobbying activities, is indeed an increasing function
20Here, we make use of the compensating schedule of the environmental lobby, i.e., CCG (e) = −ωGN ·
D(e)− UG
(
eCM , C
C
G (e
C
M )
)
whenever CCG (e) > 0 according to (21).
21We can confirm that the value of CGM (e
C
M ) is strictly positive.
22Since
∂( 1M C
C
M (e
C
M ))
∂M > 0, there is no other equilibrium outcome.
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of M because the collective contribution given by (26) is quadratic in M . The two sides
in (27) are exactly equal to each other at M = 2, and the latter exceeds the former for
all M > 2. This result implies that, since we have assumed that the regulated industry
contains at least four firms, i.e., N ≥ 4, the full organization of the industrial lobby is
impossible under collective lobbying.
We should note that, while this maximum number of 2 for the firms in the industry
lobbyist is due partly to the specific functional forms used in this model, the qualitative
implications of this result is not restricted to its specificity, and can be explained by using
the graphs of the functions depicted in Figure 1. An addition of a firm to the industrial
lobby leads to an increase in the slope of the indifference curve of the industrial lobbyist,
i.e., UM(e, C
C
M(e)). Then, an increase in its slope relative to Z(e) at any particular
emission level raises the equilibrium contribution by the industry lobby while it also
increases the emission limit at the political equilibrium. Because of the curvatures of the
two functions, the cost of the former for the participating firms will eventually outweigh
the benefit of the latter as more firms join the industrial lobby, thereby preventing the
realization of full participation by the firms in lobbying.
Let us interpret this result intuitively. In deciding on whether or not to join the
industrial lobby, a firm realizes that, once it has joined the industrial lobby, the lobby
collectively pursues the joint-benefit maximization among the participants. Thus, each
firm in the lobby is forced to take into account the benefit accrued to the other firms
within the lobby group and, as the number of firms in the group increases, this quickly
becomes too significant a burden for a firm to be compensated by the benefit it gains
through a relaxed emission control. In other words, when only the other two firms are
participating in lobbying activities, the excess burden a firm shoulders in contributing
for lobbying activities is too overbearing, compared to the benefit it receives through its
own added lobbying efforts. Thus, any attempt to pre-coordinate the lobbying activities
among firms will face a free-rider problem, although not completely, as is argued by Olson
(1965).23
23Contrary to Olson (1965), who states that a group size is inversely related to successful collective
action leading to a sub-optimal level of provision when there are multiple actors due to the free-rider con-
sideration, our result does not yield any negative relationship between a group size and the effectiveness
of the group, however.
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Does this imply that the collective lobbying case is an example of a Prisoners’ Dilemma
type situation? Certainly, it is different from a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma case in that
a limited number of firms voluntarily contribute to lobbying activities, but it has some
similarity to a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in the sense that even a free-rider in the
subgame perfect outcome could receive a higher payoff if somehow all the firms partici-
pated in collective lobbying. This can be easily checked by comparing the payoff of a firm
which does not lobby under the collective lobbying, i.e., B(eC2 ) or B(e
C
1 ), to a hypotheti-
cal payoff of a firm if all the firms joined the collective lobbying, i.e., B(eCN)− 1NCCN(eCN).
From (19) and (26), we can show that B(eCN)− 1NCCN(eCN) ≥ B(eC2 ) > B(eC1 ) if and only
if N ≥ 4. Since a firm which joins the lobbying activities needs to contribute and is
definitely worse off than a free-rider, the equilibrium outcome under collective lobbying is
indeed Pareto-inferior, as far as only the firms are concerned, to the hypothetical outcome
where every firm joins the industrial lobby group.
Whereas these results we have obtained so far under the collective lobbying regime
generally conform to the free-rider issue in the organization of a lobby group, as is dis-
cussed by Olson (1965) and Damania and Fredriksson (2000), quite different equilibrium
results are obtainable under an alternative lobbying environment as we see in the next
subsection.
3.2 Individual Lobbying
The joint-efficiency property of a compensating equilibrium still holds even if a certain
number of firms are lobbying independently. Thus, when M firms are lobbying individu-
ally, the resulting emission limit from the lobbying game, eIM , is:
eIM = e
C
M =
θ + (1− 2θ)ωP (M)
θ + (1− 2θ)ωG ·
β
δ
. (28)
The difference from the collective lobbying case lies solely in the amount which a single
lobbying firm contributes to the policymaker. In identifying the exact lobby contribution
of each firm, we follow a similar procedure to the one for the collective lobbying case
above. If one particular firm refrained from lobbying itself, it would face a different level
of the emission limit, eIM−1, which is lower than e
I
M , according to (28). In order to ensure
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that the policymaker chooses eIM instead of e
I
M−1, this firm must provide a sufficient
contribution CIM(e
I
M). By denoting the policymaker’s hypothetical payoff in the absence
of the contribution from this particular firm by ZM−1(e), therefore, ZM−1(eIM−1) = Z(e
I
M)
must hold. In other words, at the political equilibrium, we have
θN
(
B(eIM−1)−D(eIM−1)
)
+(1− 2θ)
{
(M − 1)B(eIM−1)− ωGN ·D(eIM−1)−
∑
j∈M−1 Uj(e
I
M , C
I
M(e
I
M))− UG(eIM , CIG(eIM))
}
= θN
(
B(eIM)−D(eIM)
)
+ (1− 2θ)
(
CIM(e
I
M) +
∑
j∈M−1C
I
j (e
I
M) + C
I
G(e
I
M)
)
,
(29)
where CIj (·) is the contribution from a firm j ∈M − 1 and CIG(·) is the contribution from
the environmental lobby.24 Substituting the compensating contribution schedules into
(29),25 we have
(1− 2θ)CIM(eIM) = θN
{
B(eIM−1)−D(eIM−1)−
(
B(eIM)−D(eIM)
)}
+(1− 2θ){(M − 1) (B(eIM−1)−B(eIM))}+ ωGN (D(eIM)−D(eIM−1)) . (30)
Using the specific benefit and damage cost functions, i.e., (2) and (3), (30) can be written
as26
(1− 2θ)CIM(eIM) =(
eIM − eIM−1
) [
N {θ + (1− 2θ)ωG} · δ2 · (eIM + eIM−1)− {θN + (1− 2θ) (M − 1)} β
]
.
(31)
From (31), we can obtain
CIM(e
I
M) =
1
2N
· 1− 2θ
θ + (1− 2θ)ωG ·
β2
δ
, (32)
which is independent of M , in contrast to (26), and, moreover, the following inequality
24Also, the payoff of the environmental lobby under individual lobbying is expressed as UG(e, C
I
G(e)) =
−ωGN ·D(e)− CIG(e) by replacing CG(e) by CIG(e) in (6).
25Similarly to the collective case above, the compensating contribution schedules are given by CIj (e) =
B(e)−Uj
(
eIM , C
I
G(e
I
M )
)
for j ∈M−1 and CIG(e) = −ωGN ·D(e)−UG
(
eIM , C
I
G(e
I
M )
)
whenever CIM (e) > 0
and CIG(e) > 0, respectively.
26We can confirm that the values of CIj (e
I
M ) and C
I
G(e
I
M ) are both strictly positive.
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holds:
B(eIM)−B(eIM−1) =
1
2N
· 1
θ + (1− 2θ)ωG ·
β2
δ
≥ CIM(eIM), (33)
since we have θ ∈ [0, 1
2
] by assumption. As the above inequality holds for any value of
M , the benefit of lobbying always outweighs the cost of lobbying for an individual firm,
regardless of the number of the other firms that are lobbying simultaneously. Accordingly,
we can state27
Proposition 1. Under individual lobbying, we have a unique Nash equilibrium where
all the firms participate in lobbying.
This outcome is in stark contrast to the equilibrium result in the collective lobbying
case, where only two firms, at most, participate in lobbying. As a consequence, the equi-
librium emission limit under individual lobbying becomes eIN =
θ+(1−2θ)
θ+(1−2θ)ωG ·
β
δ
, which is
greater than eC1 =
θ+(1−2θ) 1
N
θ+(1−2θ)ωG ·
β
δ
and eC2 =
θ+(1−2θ) 2
N
θ+(1−2θ)ωG ·
β
δ
under collective lobbying where
only one or two firms are engaged in lobbying activities in its equilibrium.
Focusing on the case where two firms have joined the industrial lobby in the initial
stage, the payoff of a firm which is free-riding under the collective lobbying regime is
given by B(eC2 ). This is always greater than the payoff of a firm which is contributing as
a part of the industrial lobby group under the collective lobbying, i.e., B(eC2 )− 12CC2 (eC2 ).
Thus, being under the individual lobbying regime is better for all the firms, including
a potential successful free-rider, than being under the collective lobbying regime if and
only if the following condition holds:
B(eIN)− CIN(eIN) ≥ B(eC2 ). (34)
Given the levels of eIN and e
C
2 obtained above, as well as (32), (34) reduces to N ≥ 52 . Due
to our assumption thatN ≥ 4, the above condition is always satisfied. Hence, we can state
Proposition 2. All the firms in the industry unanimously prefer the individual lob-
27This unique Nash equilibrium is also the dominant strategy equilibrium.
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bying regime to the collective lobbying regime.
Thus, unless some kind of institutional restriction is imposed on the lobby formation,
the firms should not voluntarily collude over lobbying activities. By lobbying as separate
entities, the individual firms can all achieve the best possible outcome for themselves.
While the outcome that all the firms lobby independently is the unique Nash equi-
librium of the individual lobbying game, it might be more realistic to consider that this
outcome is achieved through repeated interactions among the policymaker and the lob-
byists, and not a result of one-shot play. Under individual lobbying, even if ωP (M) < 1
realizes at one moment of time, the number of participating firms in lobbying gradually
increases and eventually ωP (M) = 1 obtains as the unique and stable equilibrium as
long as there are sufficiently large number of lobbying occasions. This dynamic process
through the repeated interactions, indeed, conforms to the observation that the number
of participating lobbyists increases steadily over time and also that the number never de-
clines, as is often reported in academic writings as well as in the news media (Grossman
and Helpman, 2001; the Guardian, 2014).
3.3 Social Welfare and an Institutional Intervention
In the presence of environmental damages, however, the socially preferable regime may
differ from the one unanimously supported by the firms in the industry. In order to
achieve the best outcome for the society, it is important to know how significantly the
environmental lobby is organized. If it is fully organized, the full-scale lobbying by the
industry lobbyist is also socially desirable since the emission limit of (4) obtains, as is
well-known in the literature (e.g., Aidt 1998). In this case, the individual lobbying out-
come is most desirable. In another case where the environmental interest is significantly
underrepresented by the environmental lobby group, i.e., ωG is sufficiently low, it might
be socially profitable to prevent individual lobbying from realizing. In particular, if the
environmental lobby is not organized at all, the society is clearly better off by having the
collective lobby regime, or even better yet by banning any type of industrial lobbying.
In finding the socially desirable lobbying regime, the levels of the social welfare under
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the two distinct equilibrium results need to be compared with one another. The collective
lobbying regime yields a greater social welfare value than the individual lobbying regime
if the following inequality holds:28
B(eC2 )−D(eC2 ) ≥ B(eIN)−D(eIN). (35)
Given the levels of eIN and e
C
2 , (35) reduces to
N ≤ 2 (1− 2θ)
[[
2β
δ
{θ + (1− 2θ)ωG} − 2θ
]
− 1
]−1
. (36)
Let us denote the right-hand side of (36) by N¯ , which is the threshold number of the
firms in the regulated industry below which the collective lobbying outcome is socially
preferable to the individual lobbying outcome. Thus, if the actual N is smaller than N¯ ,
given by the right-hand side of (36), it is beneficial for a society to institutionally prevent
firms from engaging in individual lobbying.
A straight-forward comparative statics exercise shows that an increase in ωG, which
means that the environmental interest is represented in a greater scale, leads to a smaller
threshold value of N¯ . Thus, it is now more likely that a more efficient emission level ob-
tains if the industrial interest is fully represented under the individual lobbying regime.
Therefore, we can state
Proposition 3. As the organization ratio of the environmental interest increases, the
individual lobbying regime is more likely to be socially desirable.
Simple calculations also reveal that, as the marginal damage cost of the emissions, i.e.,
δ, increases, the collective lobbying outcome is more likely to be preferred by the society,
whereas an increase in the marginal benefit of the emissions, i.e., β, leads to a case where
the individual lobbying result is more likely to be preferred. In the former case, unless
the environmental interest is completely reflected on the behavior of the environmental
lobby group, i.e., ωG = 1, the resulting over-representation of the industrial interest under
28Again, for collective lobbying we focus on the case where two firms have joined the industrial lobby
in the initial stage.
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individual lobbying becomes even more problematic with an increase in δ. In the latter
case, it is the under-representation of the industrial interest that causes more significant
harm to social welfare with a larger β.
So far, we have supposed that a particular type of lobbying regime is imposed from
the very outset. An alternative way for the society to control the type of an actual
lobbying regime is to somehow limit the lobbyists’ access to the policymaker according
to their scales. More specifically, we consider the possibility that a certain third party,
say, an administrative body, which is independent of the policymaker and attempts to
maximize social welfare, is able to impose a minimum size requirement for a potential
lobby to be qualified as a lobbyist. Even when there exists no explicit rule on the size
of a participating lobbyist, the administration may help the society to develop a de facto
standard that a policymaker does not deal with a lobbyist of a smaller scale. After all,
our results above show that the outcome under collective lobbying is Pareto-inferior for
all the firms to the outcome under individual lobbying, and the reality that we often have
consortiums of firms to represent industrial interests collectively may suggest the working
of such an implicit restriction.29
Here, we can easily establish the relationships between the minimum lobby size and
the resulting lobby environments. If the minimum size of a single lobbyist is greater than
2 in terms of the number of firms in one lobby group, there is no industry lobby operating
in our model. If it is set at somewhere between 1 and 2, there exists one industry lobby
group which consists of only two firms. This essentially corresponds with the collective
lobbying regime above, given its equilibrium outcome. If the minimum size is less than
or equal to 1, all the firms take part in lobbying independently,30 which results in the
outcome obtained under individual lobbying.
Considering these relationships, we can conclude that if the actual N is greater than
N¯ above, the minimum size should be set at less than or equal to 1, which induces the
individual lobbying outcome. On the other hand, in a case where the environmental
29Again, we should note that potential scale economies in forming a single lobby among multiple
entities are ignored in this study. Also, we have not considered the possibility of repeated interactions
among firms, which could sustain the situation with more than 2 firms in the industrial lobby as its
subgame-perfect equilibrium even under collective lobbying.
30Note that if it is exactly one, it is the strictly dominant strategy for each firm to lobby individually.
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interest is significantly underrepresented by the environmental lobby group, i.e., ωG is
sufficiently low, it might be socially beneficial to prevent individual lobbying from real-
izing and, accordingly, set the minimum lobbyist size high enough to induce collective
lobbying or even no lobbying at all.31 In particular, if the environmental lobby is not
organized at all, the society is clearly better off by imposing a minimum size restriction
which is greater than 2 in terms of a number of firms in one lobby group.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we not only endogenized the lobby participation but also analyzed the
outcomes under two distinct institutional setups for the lobbying environment: collective
and individual lobbying. Under collective lobbying firms first form a single interest group
whereas there is no such stage under individual lobbying. The difference in the outcomes is
quite striking: only a small fraction of firms engage in lobbying activities under collective
lobbying, while all the firms participate in lobbying in the unique equilibrium outcome
for the case of individual lobbying.
Moreover, under the collective lobbying regime, the equilibrium outcome is unani-
mously less preferred by all the firms to the outcome where all of them are collectively
engaged in lobbying. Under the individual lobbying regime, on the other hand, every firm
voluntarily chooses to lobby for a policy which benefits not just itself but those who share
the common interest in having a laxer environmental regulation. Rather paradoxically,
seemingly “coordinated” actions occur only when the group formation process is not pre-
coordinated. This also implies that, although we do not include potential advantages in
forming a lobby coalition, such as certain scale economies through sharing indispensable
resources, a coalition might be hard to be sustained in the long term unless such scale
economies are sufficiently strong.
From the social welfare perspective, however, the outcome under individual lobbying
may not be inferior to the outcome under collective lobbying. If that is the case, it
is beneficial for a society to institutionally prevent firms from engaging in individual
31The other threshold between no industrial lobbying and collective lobbying as the socially desirable
case can also be found in a similar fashion to the the identification of N¯ .
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lobbying, for instance, by somehow limiting the lobbyists’ access to the policymaker
according to their sizes.
Although our model is formulated in the context of environmental regulation, the
general implications of our analytical results are not necessarily restricted to the speci-
ficity of the model. Since most of the lobbying models assume some sorts of exogenous
organizations of lobbyists from the onsets, we hope that the importance of institutional
conditions on policy and welfare outcomes, which we have observed in this paper, leads
to more careful identifications of lobbying environments in future studies.
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